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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BAY SHORE EDUCATIONAL SECRETARIES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
#2A-2/26/82 .1 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0225 
! 
On September 4, 1981, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this 
Board, filed a charge alleging that the Bay Shore Educational 
. ! 
Secretaries Association (Association) had violated Civil Service j 
Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, j 
condoned and engaged in a one-day strike against .the Bay Shore 
Union Free School District on June 2, 1981. j 
The charge further alleged that approximately 34-'of the 
k 
53 employees in the negotiating unit participated in the strike, j 
I 
The Association filed an answer but thereafter agreed to j 
! 
withdraw it, thus admitting the factual allegations of the charge,! 
upon the understanding that the charging party would recommend, j 
and this Board would accept, a penalty of loss of the Association'^ 
right to have dues and agency shop fees deducted to the extent of j 
one-fourth (1/4) of the amount that would otherwise.^be deducted 
during a year. The charging party has so recommended. | 
1/ This is intended to be the equivalent of a three-month 
suspension of such right. Since: the deductions are not 
made uniformly throughout the year, it is expressed as 
a fraction of the annual deduction. 
I 7 
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On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
Association violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as 
charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the deduction rights of the Bay Shore 
Educational Secretaries Association be suspended, commencing on 
the first practicable date, and continuing for such period of 
time during which one-fourth (1/4) of its annual agency shop 
fees, if any, and dues would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, 
no dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by 
the Bay Shore Union Free School District until the Bay Shore 
Educational Secretaries Association affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against any government as required by 
the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: Albany, New York 
February 25, 198 2 
^ff&*&\/£ /fey* *~*^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
I d a K i a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Mejtfber 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, 
Respondent, 
•and-
HARRY FARKAS, 
Charging Party. 
//2B-2/26/82 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
CASE NOS. U-4779 & U-5391 
On March 24, 1980, Harry Farkas, an employee of the New York 
State Department of Health (Department), who is in the 
Professional, Scientific and Technical employees negotiating 
unit, complained to the Public Employees Federation (PEF), the 
certified representative of that unit, that the Department had 
improperly passed him over for promotion. PEF told Farkas that it 
found no "demonstrated illegality" in the action of the Department 
and on June 24, 1980, Farkas filed charge U-4779 in which he 
alleged that PEF violated its duty of fair representation to him 
by failing to give adequate attention to his complaint. 
At a pre-hearing conference held on August 5, 1980, Farkas 
conditionally withdrew his charge upon PEF's written assurance 
that it would perform two specific acts. The first was that it 
would advise him of the nature of the investigation it claimed to 
have made with regard to the Department's action. The second was 
that it would provide him with an attorney's answer to the question 
of the legality of the State's action which was the subject of 
his charge. Two months later'PEF's attorney sent Farkas a letter 
Board - U-4779 & U-5391 
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containing what purported to be a legal analysis of the State's 
action. That letter reaffirmed PEF's position that it would not 
take further action. 
Asserting that the attorney's letter did not deal with the 
substance of the legal issues raised in his complaint, Farkas 
requested that the hearing officer reopen the case.The hearing 
officer replied on October 14, 1980, "Since the matter was with-
drawn unconditionally, it is not now subject to reopening." 
Once again, Farkas wrote to the hearing officer and argued that 
the withdrawal of the charge had been conditioned upon PEF's 
doing certain acts which, he alleged, it did not do. In that 
letter he asked the hearing officer to advise him what relief 
was available to him under the Taylor Law in view of PEF's 
inaction. The hearing officer replied on January 14, 1981, saying 
that nothing could be done because 
"[Wjhere it appears that conditions for settlement have 
been met, PERB will not reopen the matter closed on 
the basis thereof. Such is the case here. Therefore, 
I see no avenue available to you before PERB'on your 
original complaint." 
Thereafter, Farkas complained to the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation but that complaint, too, 
was unavailing. On April 21, 1981,. he filed a second charge 
against PEF (U-5391). This charge also complained that PEF 
violated its duty to him by failing to give adequate attention to 
his complaint that the Department improperly denied him an 
opportunity for promotion. Among other things, the relief sought 
in the second case included the reopening of the first. 
Board - U-4779 & U-5391 
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The charge in U-5391 differed from that in U-4779 in some 
details, but the hearing officer found the differences to be 
inconsequential. As the charge dealt with events that transpired 
more than four months before it was filed, he dismissed it on 
the ground that it was not timely. Dealing with the request for 
;the..xeop:ening-.o:f-:--.th&„fi-rst--ea.s.. 
the matter was beyond his authority and must be addressed to this 
Board. 
Farkas then filed exceptions to the hearing officer's 
decision. We ruled on them on January 11, 1982, affirming the 
hearing officer and denying Farkas' request for the reopening 
of the earlier case. Explaining the second point, we noted that 
the hearing officer had written to Farkas on January 14, 1981, 
that the earlier case would not be reopened because the condition 
of withdrawal had been met and that this letter of the hearing 
officer should have been treated as a final decision. Accordingly, 
the time during which to file exceptions to this decision expired •: 
within 15 working days of Farkas' receipt of the letter. 
Farkas has now moved this Board to reconsider its decision 
of January 11, 1982. PEF has responded to the motion and has 
urged us to deny it. 
Insofar as the motion addresses the substantive issues 
relating to U-5391, it makes no point that was not considered by 
us in our former decision,, and, to that extent, the motion is 
denied. Insofar as it addresses our refusal, in that decision, to; 
reopen U-4779, the motion is persuasive. Ordinarily we would not 
permit a party to seek to reopen an earlier case "by the filing 
t* 7398 
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of a new improper practice charge. As we noted in our former deci-
sion, the timely filing of exceptions to a hearing officer's 
decision is the usual and proper procedure for bringing a case 
before us. Here, however, Farkas makes the point that the letters 
of the hearing officer.- denying his request to reopen U-4779 should 
not have been: deemed7 decisions -bee aus.©;' they- were not in the..form -.of a 
-formal- -de"e-ts%Qia:---n-0"-3=^ d4^ 1=i^ b-H#e:d-"- in -~ the -• manner™ ^r-es^Gr-gtbed-vby ^our; -*- -----r-
rules. Moreover, the hearing officer''S letters informed Farkas 
that there was no way available to him to bring the matter to this 
Board. Thus, Farkas was not put on notice that he could have filed 
exceptions to the letters and thereby brought the issue- to this 
Board. 
Having found this argument to be persuasive, we confront-.-
for the first time-, the question of whether the conditions for the 
withdrawal of the charge were met. In doing so, we note that the 
conditions were sufficiently narrow and concrete for the question 
to be readily susceptible to answer. Where, a charge is withdrawn 
upon a written understanding that such narrow and concrete condi-
tions be met by a respondent and the conditions are of a material 
nature, the failure of the respondent to perform those acts may 
nullify the withdrawal of the charge. Such is the case here. 
The record indicates that Farkas' complaint was that PEF 
would not represent him in a claim that the Department reclassified 
•and altered the qualification for a position within his promotional 
line solely for the purpose of denying him that promotional 
opportunity. Thus, he was not challenging the Department's general 
power to reclassify or alter job qualifications, but was claiming 
that the reclassification was undertaken in order to evade Civil 
Service merit and fitness requirements. PEF's attorney's letter 
Board - U-4779 & U-5391 -5 
did not address this claim. It merely contained a correct recita-
tion of Farkas' rights assuming a proper reclassification.— 
Accordingly, we conclude that the condition for withdrawal of 
the charge in U-4779 was not met. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that U-4779 be reopened and remanded 
_....L^_...- -..-._-. -: ,-..-..- • ;_ to. ._t:ke--:he.ar.ing^ .of£i.ce.r „Jo^ r_:^ furth.er:.p-r^ C:e.edings 
consistent with this opinion. 
DATED: February 26, 1982 
Albany, New York 
'HaroldK. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Rand 
1/ 
— Having found that the second condition for the withdrawal 
was not met, we do not find it necessary to determine 
whether the first condition was met. 
STATS OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMSEWOQUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Respondent, 
-and-
#2C-2/26/82 
BOARD' DECISION AND' ORDER 
CASE NOV U-5T66 
PORT JEFFERSON STATION TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2935, 
i 
Charging Party, 
FREDERIC BLOCK, P.C. (SANDERS L. KURTZ, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD L. NEWCOMB, for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Port Jefferson Station I 
Teachers Association, Local 2935 (Association). It alleges that j 
the Comsewogue Union Free School District (District).•violated j 
§209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law in that Rovegna, its.superintendent, 
reprimanded Bodkin, a representative of the Association, for givin~ 
advice of which he disapproved to Kaufman, a fellow unit employee, 
in the course of his duties as an Association representative. 
FACTS 
Kaufman was directed to make arrangements with Austen, 
Rovegna's administrative assistant, for makeup time for religious 
observance leave. Kaufman consulted with Bodkin who told him that 
he believed the requirement of makeup time to be a violation 
1/ of contract and that a grievance was pending on the matter.— 
7J59 
1/ An arbitrator later determined that the requirement of makeup 
time was not a violation of contract. 
Board - U-5166 
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According to the District, Kaufman also told Austen that Bodkin 
2/ 
advised him to ignore the directive.— Austen reported this to 
Rovegna in a memorandum that referred to Bodkin by name and 
identified him as being in a "leadership position" in the 
Association, serving as the High School Building Reuresentative. 
„.„..:.-..;;Rovegna__;wa^  
to Kaufman and on November 17, 1980, he wrote a memorandum to 
Bodkin which he designated as "an official reprimand". The 
Association then filed the charge herein and the District 
responded with a. general denial. 
The hearing officer scheduled seven pre-hearing conferences 
over a six-month period in 1981, but each of these was cancelled. 
Throughout this period, the hearing officer was in touch with the 
parties for the purpose of trying to help them settle the dispute 
between them. Failing to accomplish this and concluding that 
there were no significant issues of fact, he suggested that each 
submit a proposed statement of material facts, indicating that 
he would dispense with the hearing if there were no issues of 
fact. Each party "sent 'him a statement'containing--its under-;-
standing of the facts. The District's statement contained argu-
ments as well as allegations of fact. It argued that Bodkin should 
have utilized the grievance procedure in the contract "and not 
taken upon himself the unilateral right to decide that a teacher 
should ignore or disregard an Administrative directive . . . ." 
— T h e Association denies this. It asserts that Kaufman was told 
to comply with the directive under protest. The record does not. 
show which is correct and the question need not be resolved for 
the purpose of this decision as it finds a violation by the 
District even on the assumption that the District's statement of' 
the fact is the correct one. 
Board - U-5166 -3 j 
I 
It also argued that, even if Bodkin were wrongly reprimanded, the 
reprimand would merely constitute a contract violation and should 
not be addressed by this Board. In this connection, it asked the 
hearing officer to issue no decision on the merits and that, if 
he contemplated doing so, he should reschedule a pre-hearing 
conference. The hearing officer denied this request; upon 
re^ "e"iiring^ "l:he""pa^ tie"s"' sTatemerrtrs"7'"he~"irffOT I— 
were no material facts in dispute and that he would issue a 
decision on the papers before him. He invited the parties to 
submit briefs, but neither party did so. Neither did they make 
any further complaint about the hearing officer's procedure. 
On the basis of the material before him, the hearing 
officer determined that Rovegna's action coerced Bodkin because 
of his exercise of his protected rights. The matter now comes 
I 
to us on the District's exceptions to that decision. The 
District makes four arguments in support of its exceptions. First, 
we have no jurisdiction over the matter because the charge merely 
alleges a violation of contract. Second, in any event, the 
decision must be reversed because of procedural defects: the 
Board's rules require the hearing officer to hold a conference and 
a hearing and do not authorize him to request the parties to 
submit a summary of facts. Third, the record does not establish 
a fact that is essential to the hearing officer's decision, to witl 
i 
that Bodkin was acting in his capacity of representative of [ 
the Association when he advised Kaufman to ignore Rovegna's 
directive. Finally, Bodkin's advice to Kaufman constituted 
- . I 
insubordination and was, therefore, not protected even if he did I 
! 
act m a representative capacity, \ 
h $ '7357 
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DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of 
the parties, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer. 
It is clear that the conduct complained about in the charge 
constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. That 
-con.dnGj1S:.:_c0ns_-i;S„t.s. .of;X:oer-eio;n„jo£ :_a^^ •__..'_ 
exercised rights protected by §202 of the Taylor Law. That it 
may also be a violation of contract is irrelevant. Section 205.5 (d] 
of the.Taylor Law merely provides that this Board "shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an 
agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper . . . 
practice." 
Given the difficulty that the hearing officer had in securing 
the parties' attendance at a conference, it was neither unreason-
able nor inappropriate for him to invite them to submit their 
respective summaries of the facts. The parties accepted this 
invitation and the District may not now be heard to complain 
about the procedure for ascertaining the facts. The District's 
request that the hearing officer issue no decision without the 
mutual consent of the parties does not constitute a challenge to 
the adequacy of the record on which the hearing officer issued 
his decision. The hearing officer committed no error by refusing 
to comply with the District's request that, notwithstanding the 
completion of the record, he delay writing his decision until 
after he attempted to reschedule a pre-hearing conference. 
7; 
i 73 
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A reasonable reading of the District's submission to the 
learing officer makes it clear that it had not placed in issue 
the allegation that Bodkin was acting in his capacity as repre-
sentative of the Association when he advised Kaufman to ignore 
Rovegna's directive. Moreover, the documents that.constitute 
-5 
the record show, that Rovegna knew that Bodkin was acting in such 
a capacity. The District's papers identify Bodkin as both the 
person who advised Kaufman and as "an individual in a leadership 
position in the Teachers Association." 
This leaves the District's argument on the merits: that 
Bodkin did not enjoy a protected right to advise Kaufman to ignore 
lovegna's directive because such advice constituted insubordina-
tion. The District makes two arguments in support of this 
proposition. The first is that a School District's reprimand of 
a teacher cannot constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. 
The basis of this argument is Holt v. Board of Education, 52 NY2d 
525 (1981), 'which holds that a tenured teacher may not complain 
about a written reprimand under Education Law §3020-A because the 
reprimand is not a disciplinary action but an administrative 
evaluation. This decision is not applicable to the Taylor Law. 
The reprimand of an employee because, as a union official, he 
advises a fellow employee as to what he believes his rights to be 
constitutes interference with a protected right and a violation 
}f §209-a.l(a). The District's second argument cites' Pickering 
y. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Puentes' v." Board 
3f Education, 24 NY2d 996 (1969),,which indicate that, under 
certain circumstances, criticism of a school district by a 
7360 
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teacher might not be protected by the first amendment, even if 
the critic is a union, official. This argument, too, is 
inapplicable. The case before us does not involve the right of 
a union official to criticize his employer; it involves the right j 
of a union representative to advise a unit employee to ignore \ 
a directive from his employer imposing what the official believes j 
• . • i 
is not a proper working condition. The employee who follows that j 
i 
advice is exposing himself to the risk of being charged with j 
! 
insubordination, but the union official's right to give the advice I 
3/ ! 
is protected by the Taylor,Law.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District ! 
to remove the original and all copies of the j 
I 
November 17, 1980 memorandum and all i 
i 
references to it from any files in its j 
custody or control or in the custody or 
control of its officers, agents or employees, 
and to refrain from otherwise considering 
them or using them thereafter-
to cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining or coercing its employees in 
the exercise of their rights protected by 
the Taylor Law; 
to sign and post a notice in the form. 
attached in every building in which a unit 
3/ There is no protected Taylor Law right to advise public 
employees to strike, but that is not the nature of the advice 
that Bodkin gave to Kaufman, 
Board - U-5166 
employee works a t a l l l o c a t i o n s o r d i n a r i l y 
used to pos t n o t i c e of in fo rma t ion to u n i t 
employees. 
DATED: February 25, 1982 
Albany, New York 
V£*t?3!?L&>k<~S 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
j^L. /C%<^^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C.Randies, 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees t h a t the Comsewogue Union Free School 
D i s t r i c t ( D i s t r i c t ) 
7 • ) 1. Will remove the original and all copies of a 
memorandum dated November 17, 1980 from R. Peter 
Rovegna, Superintendent, to William Bodkin, and 
all reference thereto, from any file in the custody 
or control of the District, its officers, agents or 
employees and will not consider or otherwise use the 
memorandum or references thereto for any purpose 
hereafter; 
2. Will not interfere with, restrain or coerce employees 
in the exercise of their rights under the Act. 
Cornsewoque Union Free School District 
Dated By...... (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. HHOOO 
>. 7oo£ 
STATE. OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ORANGE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
ORANGE COUNTY UNIT, ORANGE COUNTY 
LOCAL 836, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
#2D-2/26/82 
^DARDJDECiSiON^AND^ORDER^^-F 
CASE NO. U-52 81 
! 
JAMES G. SWEENEY, ESQ.• (ALBERT 
PACIONE, JR., ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESOS. 
(WILLIAM M. WALLENS, ESQ. of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of \ 
Orange (County) to a hearing officer's decision that the County 
I 
i 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law, by unilaterally mcreasmgl 
i; 
the maintenance fee required of certain employees for occupying 
County-owned residences. The employees are represented by the 
charging party, Orange County Unit, Orange County Local 836, Civil! 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). 
l_ / Although CSEA identified seven individuals as affected by the 
County's unilateral action and although the County has 
challenged CSEA's representational rights over the affected 
employees, it is nevertheless admitted that at least two of 
the employees are in the bargaining unit. Our jurisdiction 
is therefore established. 
Board - U-5281 -2 
For many years the County has owned several residences which 
it has provided to some of its employees including those as to 
whom it raises no jurisdictional challenge. By local law, the 
County fixed the maintenance fee for the residences at $75 per 
month in 1967 and at $100 per month in 1972. These amounts have 
been deducted from the employees' paychecks. On February 13, j 
1981, the County, without negotiations ;with CSEA, by legislative 
I 
resolution instituted an additional fee equal to 20% of the annual] 
i 
utility cost attributable to each residence. The fee is scheduled 
I 
to increase by an additional 20% over succeeding years until the I 
I 
affected employees eventually bear the full cost of utilities.1 f 
Uncontradicted testimony by affected employees discloses that when 
first hired they were informed that the low salaries of their j 
respective positions were rationalized by the offered County-owned j 
housing. In at least one case, residency in such housing was made 
a requirement of the job. 
The principal exceptions of the County may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The payment of maintenance is not a term and 
condition of employment. 
2. Rockland County BOCES, 41 NY2d 753-(1977)
 r- 10 PERB 
1(7.010:,- renders:. Triborbugh.:. A5 PERB. <j(3037 (1972) >-• in-
applicable 'because the...inr*roaeog, -costs of; fuels i 
! 
represent ."increments'1 to the affected employees. ! 
| 
1 
i 
7364 
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3. The inflationary increase in fuel costs creates an 
emergency condition justifying an exception to 
Tri bo rough under the' Wappinger decision, 5 PERB 
1(3074 (1972). 
4. Exercise by the public employer of its legislative 
--------- ~~~ ---•---•-•-•- ---authority-^a~rlx^ -
practice. 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer and conclude 
that her discussion adequately disposes of the first three 
exceptions as well as other tangential arguments which we have 
considered and find to be without merit. In support of the 
fourth exception listed above, the County argues that since it 
has legislative authority to abolish positions, a fortiori, it 
has authority to alter terms and conditions of employment. 
We do not agree. 
While the exercise of legislative authority, per se, may j 
not sustain an improper practice chargec the manner of its 
exercise can, and has been found to provide the basis for the 
finding that an improper practice has been committed, Bd. of j 
Trustees of the Ulster County Community College and the Ulster 
County Legislature,• 4 PERB 1(3088 (1971) . Further, the authority 
to abolish positions and offices is not an unfettered power. 
Thus, in Village of Wayland, 9 PERB 1(3084 (1976) , confirmed sub 
nom. Village of Wayland v. PERB, 61 AD2d 674 (3d Dept., 1978), 
• j 
11 PERB 1(7004, the abolition by the Village trustees of its polices 
department was circumscribed by its obligation to observe the ( 
7365 ! 
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Taylor Law and an improper practice found in that abolition was 
sustained as well as the remedial order issued therefor. The 
County's arguments, based upon the premise that the County Law 
and Municipal Home Rule give it preeminent power over conflicts 
arising under the Civil Service Law, have long been found to be 
wanting, City of Albany v.' He'Isby, 29^Yjd_43_3 J1972).,....5.r. PERB 
1f7000; City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 NY2d 19 (1975), 8 PERB 
1(7011; City of Albany and Maikels. v. PERB, 57 AD2d 374, 3d Dept. , 
(1977), 10 PERB 1(7012, aff'd. 43 NY2d 954 (1978), 11 PERB 1(7007. 
NOW, THEREFORE/ WE ORDER the County of Orange to: 
1. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA any change 
in the maintenance charge; 
2. Rescind the revised maintenance schedule and reinsti-
tute the amount formerly deducted from the affected 
y 
employees' paychecks; 
3. Refund any monies received from the affected 
employees in excess of the former amount charged 
for maintenance with interest on such excess at the 
rate of three (3) percent per annum; and 
2/ In a prior proceeding, County of Orange, 14 PERB 1(3060 (1981) , 
this Board directed the County to rescind its action excluding 
some of the employees who 
the,bargaining unit. 
are the subject of this case from 
he County has initiated an Article 78 
proceeding which has been transferred to the Appellate 
Division and is now pending. Our order in this case is 
intended to extend also to those employees who are the 
subject of this proceeding and whose exclusion from the 
bargaining unit we previously disapproved. 
7366 
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4. Post a copy of the notice attached hereto at 
each location on its premises upon which notices 
of information to unit personnel are ordinarily 
posted. 
-;D-MJED--:--••- --A4b:a33.y4-vN-ew-.---Xo£ k — 
February 25, 1982 
>ld R. Newman, Chairman 
< ^ « ^ /C&L<JLS$-—-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Membe 
7367 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify °ur Employees that: 
1. We will negotiate in good faith with CSEA any 
change in the maintenance charge; 
2. We will rescind the revised maintenance schedule 
and reinstitute the former amount deducted from 
the affected employees' paychecks; 
3. We will refund any monies received from the 
affected employees in excess of the former 
amount charged for maintenance with interest 
on this amount at the rate of three (3) percent 
per annum. 
COUNTY OF ORANGE 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^Qfift 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CAPTAIN'S ENDOWMENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
Charging Party. 
JOHN SNEEDEN, for Respondent 
BRUCE J. MALLORY, pro se 
The Captain's Endowment Association (Association) represents 
superior officers employed by the New York City Transit Police 
Department. Bruce J. Mal-lory is such an officer and was a member 
of the Association until April 15, 1977. He resigned his member-
ship on that day because he opposed a '.lawsuit:;: the Association 
was commencing and he objected to paying a $100 assessment that 
it imposed upon each member in order to raise funds to pay for the 
lawsuit.: In January, 1980, Mai lory applied for reinstatement as 
a member of the Association. He was reaccepted on condition that 
he pay the $100 assessment which he had not paid three years 
earlier and which had occasioned his resignation and that he pay a 
fine of $100. Mallory then filed the charge herein in which he 
asserted that the assessment and the fine constituted penalties 
for exercising his legal right to resign from the Association. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5343 
Board - U-5343 -2 
The hearing officer concluded that the Association's demand 
that Mallory pay the assessment did no more than require him to 
pay an obligation for which hevwas in arrears at the time of his 
resignation. Accordingly, he dismissed that part of the charge 
that complained about the assessment. Mallory has filed no ob-
- ^ j-eet^ dtts--t^ ~t±L^  
hearing officer determined, however, that the imposition of the 
fine was an improper practice because it was imposed upon him for 
his act of resignation and the amount of the fine was related, in 
part, to the length of time he chose to exercise his right not to 
be a member of the Association. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the Associa-
tion to this part of the hearing officer's decision. In its 
exceptions, the Association asserts that the hearing officer erred 
in concluding that the fine was imposed for post-resignation con-
duct. It goes on to state that the fine was imposed because of 
"Mallory's nonpayment of an assessment" and because of his "res-
ignation" at a time when it had to commence the lawsuit. 
If the Association's stated reasons for fining Mallory are 
accepted, it may have been motivated by both a proper and an 
improper reason. It might have been proper for the Association 
to impose the fine because of Mallory"s nonpayment of the assess-
ment while-still a member,— but it would not have been proper 
— It is not clear that Mallory was obligated to pay the assess-
ment while still a member. He resigned two months after the 
assessment was imposed without having first paid it, but the 
resolution imposing the assessment gave members three months 
in which to pay. -
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Board - U-5343 -3 
for it to have done so as a penalty for Mallory1s resignation. 
Section 202 of the Taylor Law explicitly gives public employees 
the right to refrain from "joining, or participating in, any em-
ployee organization . . .". A fine penalizing a public employee 
for exercising this right constitutes a violation of §209-a.2 of 
the~Taw. 
When a decision to penalize a public employee is substan-
tially motivated by reasons that are improper under the Taylor 
Law, the party imposing the penalty commits an improper practice 
even if additional legitimate reasons underlie its decision to 
do so. The Association's exceptions contain an admission that 
Mallory1s resignation was a substantial factor in its decision to 
fine him. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing 
officer., 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Association to cease and desist 
from requiring the payment of the fine as a 
condition for Mallory's reinstatement to 
membership in the Association and to post 
the attached notice in all places within 
the Transit Department to which it has 
access by contract, practice or otherwise. 
Dated, Albany, New York . . 
February 26, 1982 jj /? /) j / 
HarorlcfvR. Newman, Chairman 
'David"C. Randies," Memb 
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OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER KLAUS, CONCURRING 
", :...." I find that the controlling reason for the fine 
was the act of resignation. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
February 26, 1982 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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APPENDIX 
E TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
The Captain's Endowment Association (Association) hereby notifies 
all persons included in the negotiating unit it represents within 
the New York City Transit Police Department that it will not 
require of its former members as a condition to their reinstate-
ment to membership in the Association the payment of any fines 
levied upon them by reason of their resignation. 
Captain's Endowment Association 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer/ 
- a n d -
iBA-2/26/82 
C a s e N o . 
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
P e t i t i o n e r , , 
- a n d -
BRENTWOOD CLERICAL, SOCIAL, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
I n t e r v e n o r . 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
C-2378 
PSRB 5 8 . 3 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r b y t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i n a c c o r d a n c e 
w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t a n d t h e R u l e s of . 
P r o c e d u r e , o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d . 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e B o a r d b y t h e P u b l i c 
E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
I T I S HEREBY C E R T I F I E D t h a t 
BRENTWOOD CLERICAL, SOCIAL, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d a n d s e l e c t e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s o f 
t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n - t h e u n i t a g r e e d u p o n b y t h e 
p a r t i e s a n d d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e - f o r 
t h e p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f 
g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t : I n c l u d e d : S p e c i a l e d u c a t i o n a i d e , s c h o o l a t t e n d a n c e a i d e and a l l 
c o m p e t i t i v e f u l l - t i m e and p a r t - t i m e c l e r i c a l employees i n t h e 
f o l l o w i n g t i t l e s : s e n i o r c l e r k t y p i s t , s e n i o r accoun t c l e r k , 
c l e r k t y p i s t , s e n i o r c l e r k , c l e r k , p r i n c i p a l c l e r k , key punch 
o p e r a t o r , computer .programmer, accoun t c l e r k , d u p l i c a t i n g 
machine o p e r a t o r I I , d u p l i c a t i n g machine o p e r a t o r I I I , 
p r i n c i p a l accoun t c l e r k , g r a p h i c s m a t e r i a l d e s i g n e r , s e n i o r 
s t e n o g r a p h e r , s t e n o g r a p h e r , and computer o p e r a t o r , I I 
E x c l u d e d : A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a s s i s t a n t t o t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , s e n i o r c l e r k 
t y p i s t / s e c r e t a r y t o t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , ' s e n i o r c l e r k t y p i s t / 
s e c r e t a r y t o t h e b u s i n e s s manager and s e n i o r c l e r k t y p i s t s 
i n t h e . c e n t r a l o f f i c e 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c - e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h 
BRENTWOOD CLERICAL, SOCIAL, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d . t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h - s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n ' t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
=£i-5~s£, :Cn. . the- 25 th d a y of—February , 1 0 S 2 
Albany, New York 
l i a r o l d R. N e w m a n , C h a i r m , ' r m a n 
7374 David C. R a n d i e s , Membe 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
.ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
. Employer, 
- a n d -
NEA/ROCHESTER, NYEA/NEA, 
.#3B-2/26/82 
Case No. C-233E 
PERB 5 8 .3 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
ROCHESTER TEACHERS.ASSOCIATION ; 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and.described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations' and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All teachers [Salary Bracket TI and. Til] including, 
but not limited to,. Classroom Teachers; Contract 
Substitute Teachers; Attendance Teachers; Helping 
Teachers; Librarians; Guidance Counselors; Speech 
and Hearing Teachers; School Psychologists; School. 
Social Workers and Library, and Media Specialists 
Excluded:' All other employees of the employer 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named .public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with 
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
and enter into a' written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 25th day of February, 1982 
Albany, New York 
(77$-*-' l^y-eu+^G-—^-
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Pursuant to and by virtue of the authority vested in the Public Employment 
,,'
 N Relations Board under Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, I, Harold R. Newman, 
1
 ) Ciriairman of the Public Employmeyxt Relations Board, acting on behalf of such Board, 
hereby amend NICRR Title 4, Chapter VII, as follows. Any parts of the Rules of 
the Board not explicitly' mentioned herein remain in effect as previously promulgated. 
These amendments shall take effect on , 1982. 
Section 201.3(h) is hereby added as follows: 
201.3(h) A petition for certification may be filed during the fifth month of 
• the-fiscal-year, of a. public employer to._ de.t&rmine..the_unit^jplac3ment of a position _ 
which is not claimed by any party to the proceeding to be within an existing unit 
and which has been created or reclassified since the first day of the fifth month 
of the previous fiscal year of the public employer; provided, however, that no 
employee organization which has been recognized or certified may file such petition 
concerning any position which was created or reclassified prior to such recognition 
or certification. 
Section 201.4(e) is hereby amended as follows: 
§201.4(e) The Director may direct an investigation and, if necessary, a hearing 
whenever he deems it appropriate to ascertain whether the evidence submitted is 
accurate. If he determines that evidence is fraudulent or that the declaration 
) is false, he shall take such reasonable action [that] as_ he deems appropriate to 
" protect the integrity of the procedures of the Board in connection with the pending 
matter. Such a determination and such action taken by the Director shall be 
reviewable by the Board pursuant to section 201.12 of these Rules. 
Section 201.5(a)(7) is hereby amended as follows: 
§201.5(a)(7) If an employee organization, whether the [requisite] showing of 
interest requirement, as set forth in sections 201. 3 and 201.4 of these Rules, 
is met. 
Section 201.5(b)(8) is hereby amended as follows: 
§201.5(b)(8) If an employee organization, whether the [requisite] showing of 
interest requirement, as set forth in sections 201.3 and 201.4 of these Rules, 
is met. 
Section 201.10(e) is hereby amended as follows: 
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§201.10(e) Intervention. One or more persons or an employee organization acting 
J in their behalf may be permitted, in the discretion of the Board, [or in the 
discretion] of the Director, or the designated trial examiner, to intervene in 
the proceeding. The intervener must make a motion on notice to all parties in the 
proceeding. Supporting affidavits establishing the basis for the motion may be 
required by the Board, [or] the Director, or the designated trial examiner. If 
intervention is permitted, the person or employee organization becomes a party for 
all purposes, 
Section 201.12(a) is hereby amended as follows: 
§201.12(a) Within [IQ] 15 working days after receipt of the decision of the Director, 
a party may file with the Board an original and four copies of a statement in writing 
setting forth exceptions thereto, and an. original and four copies of a brief in 
support thereof shall be filed with the Board simultaneously, at which time copies 
of such exceptions and brief shall be served upon each party to the proceeding and 
proof of such service shall be filed with the Board. 
Section 201.12(c) is hereby amended as follows: 
§201.12(c) Within seven working days after service of exceptions, any party may 
file an original and four copies of a response thereto or cross-exceptions and a 
breif in support thereof. Copies of these documents shall simultaneously be served 
upon each party to the proceeding, at which time proof, of such service shall be 
filed with the Board. 
Section 202.4(g)(5) is hereby amended as follows: 
§202.4(g)(5) If an employee organization, whether the [requisite] showing of 
interest requirement, as set forth in sections 201.3 and 201.4 of these Rules, 
is met. • 
Section 204.10(c) is hereby amended as follows: 
§204.10(c) Within [five] 15 working days after receipt of a decision of the 
Director dismissing a charge because the facts alleged do not, as a matter of 
law, constitute a violation of the Act, the charging party may file with the 
Board an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth his 
appeal from the decision, together with.proof of service of a copy thereof upon 
each respondent. The statement shall set forth the reasons for the appeal. 
Section 207.7(b) is hereby amended as follows: 
§207.7(b) Additional Lists. If a party determines that more than two names on 
a panel list are unacceptable, a request by such party for an additional panel 
list shall be filed with the Director of Conciliation within the ten-day time 
period established for selection and preferential ranking. A copy of such request 
shall be sent to the other party simultaneously. Each party shall have the right 
to request one additional list, and consequently, no party shall receive more than 
three panel lists. Pursuant to the selection process, if the parties fail to 
select an arbitrator after the submission of a third panel list, the Director of 
Conciliation shall take whatever steps are necessary to designate an arbitrator. 
Section 214.2 is hereby amended as follows: 
§214.2 Filing of Reports by Public Employers. Each public employer [who] which 
grants recognition to an employee organization, including every local government 
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that has obtained a determination by the Board that its provisions and procedures 
are substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in the 
Act and these Rules, and public employee organizations that are recognized or 
certified, shall file with the Board such reports as the Board shall require. 
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